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Pubblico e privato nei servizi idrici
• Dibattito sulla “privatizzazione dei servizi idrici“ 
polarizzato tra opposti estremismi
– “mujaheddin del pubblico” vs. “talebani delle gare”
– paradosso: perché la liberalizzazione coincide con l’aumento 
delle tariffe ?
• Analisi dell’esperienza internazionale suggerisce una 
valutazione più attenta e meno ideologica
– il settore idrico continua a presentare rilevanti “market 
failures”
– la differenza non la fa il modello, ma la qualità del sistema di
regolazione
– Attenzione ad usare gli indicatori giusti
Significati alternativi
• Diritti di proprietà privati sulla risorsa
– la libera appropriazione dell’acqua, salvo casi marginali ed 
eccezionali, non è in discussione
– Criteri di efficienza economica nell’attribuzione dei diritti 
d’uso della risorsa
– Strumenti di mercato (es. water quality trading)
• Coinvolgimento privato nella gestione dei servizi
– Forme e modi da valutare ó market failures
– Analogie e differenze con altre utilitiesó no “one size fits all
• Finanziamento: dalla fiscalità alle tariffe
– progressività vs. “polluter-pays principle”
– autosufficienza, tempestività, selettività
I principali driver della liberalizzazione
• Necessità di cambiare l’approccio alla politica idrica
– dalla “politica delle infrastrutture” alla politica del controllo della domanda
– dalla politica dei “fabbisogni da soddisfare” alla logica della sostenibilità
– dalla politica settoriale alle politiche integrate
• Necessità di industrializzazione e modelli gestionali imprenditoriali
– Limiti di efficacia della pianificazione pubblica e necessità di investire i 
gestori delle scelte strategiche (es. infrastrutture)
– Crescente complessità e internazionalizzazione della filiera industriale
– Opportunità di valorizzare sul mercato competenze maturate dalle imprese
• Copertura dei costi e finanziamento sul mercato
– Finanza non può più gravare interamente sul pubblico
– Ruolo del privato come “esattore”
– Utilizzo efficiente delle infrastrutture e dei centri di costo
• Fattori esogeni e trasversali
– Superiorità di regolazione di tipo “antagonistico” per ciò che attiene alla 
qualità del servizio nelle sue diverse componenti (es. ambientale)
– Multiutilities: settore idrico “trascinato” verso il privato dalle trasformazioni 
in corso in altri mercati più aperti alla concorrenza, es. energia e gas
I principali ostacoli alla liberalizzazione
• Introduzione di concorrenza più problematica che in altri SGI
– concorrenza nel mkt poco praticabile nel settore idrico, a parte casi in cui non 
conviene estendere le reti fisse o vi sono soggetti abbastanza grandi da poter 
provvedere da soli (concetto di “grande” è f della complessità di accesso alla risorsa)
– “Essential facilities” rappresentano la parte più importante del costo
• limitato interesse di TPA ó unbundling rete / servizi poco utile
• Fabbisogno di investimenti molto elevato ó fattore critico è efficienza della CAPEX
– Rilevanza del lungo periodo, incertezza e hold-up
• gare “fixed price” poco praticabili; 
• meccanismi di “risk sharing” fondamentali nel circoscrivere il rischio per il privato, 
altrimenti difficilmente sostenibile
– PPP possibile in varie forme ma aperta al rischio di “cattura”
• Componenti di interesse generale
– Elevato valore sociale del servizio, costi sociali del “black out” molto elevati
– Componente “pubblica” della domanda è molto importante: il settore è assimilabile 
solo in parte alle utilities e molto più al caso delle infrastrutture urbane
– Componente pubblica dela domanda è il principale fattore di crescita del settore
– Rilevanza del lungo periodo ó tema della sostenibilità
– Settore in cui la dinamica tariffaria è in ogni caso limitata da ragioni sociali
Contributi recenti della ricerca economica
• Crescente scetticismo riguardo alla possibilità di espandere in modo 
significativo la concorrenza
– Evidenza empirica poco robusta a supporto della liberalizzazione
– Analisi cross-section non evidenziano sempre una superiore performance
– Analisi di impatto della privatizzazione UK evidenzia che non ci sono stati alcuni 
dei temuti effetti negativi, ma è ambigua nel valutare i benefici
• Produttività del lavoro cresce, ma produttività totale dei fattori no
• Effetto positivo va attribuito alla regolazione e non alla privatizzazione
– Concorrenza per il mercato tende a favorire imprese verticalmente integrate, a 
scapito della concorrenza nel mercato lungo la filiera
– Sostanziale convergenza di risultati sia a livello teorico che empirico
• Ricerca applicata e panel istituzionali confermano queste valutazioni
– “private sector involvement is minimal in the US; privatization unlikely to grow in 
the future” NRC - National Research Council – Committee on Privatization of Water Services in the United States, 
2002. Privatization of Water Services in the United States. An Assessment of Issues and Experience. Washington DC, 
National Academy
– World Bank: dalle concessioni alle “private-public partnerships”
– UE: documenti della Commissione vedono il settore adatto soprattutto a forme di 
outsourcing e PPP, non liberalizzazione e privatizzazione radicale
Interactions between water resources and water services
Axis Description Regulatory issues / market failures
Incomplete contracts
Transactions costs
Sunk costs
Information aymmetries
Vertical integration
Cost of capital for long-run undertakings
Principal-agent relations in procurement
Externalities
Long-run sustainability of water management
systems
Transactions costs in the trade of water rights
Natural monopoly
Public good dimensions (eg health issues)
Accessibility and affordability issues
Resilience and flexibility
I Transactions between the WSS operator
and public entities holding the
responsibility for service provision
II Transactions between the WSS operator
and suppliers of inputs along the value
chain
III Transactions between WSS operator and
entities holding the property rights on
natural resources
IV Transactions between WSS operators and
final consumers
Transactions in the water industry and related market failures
Operator
Private 
partner
Consumers
Responsible
entity
Market for goods, services,
labour & capital
Tariffs
Industrial costs
Financial costs
Industrial costs
Financial costs
Lease fees
Dividends
Capital gain
Royalties
Dividends
Transfer prices
Transfers
Public budget
Industrial costs
Financial costs
Taxation
Asset
ownershipInvestment
Maintenance
Renewal
Extension
A general representation of economic and financial flows in WS&S 
Owner of
property rights on
water resources
Water taxes
Ear-marked
subsidies
Fiscal
Direct cost of self-supply
II market
III market
IV market
I market
Different ways of involving the market
• Primary market (operators vs. responsible entities): 
– competitive tendering for operation (and/or asset management)
– incentive regulation, benchmarking
– Corporatization (ev. PPP) and soft regulation of public companies
• Secondary market (operators vs. providers of inputs): 
– outsourcing, 
– corporate control, 
– procurement, 
– DBFO
• Tertiary market (operators vs. owners of property rights on water): 
– tradable property rights
– Innovative agreements (eg with agriculture)
• Quaternary market (operators vs. final consumers): 
– customers’ eligibility for free autonomous organizations; 
– users’ cooperatives + community systems for asset ownership/management
Alternative management models
• Regulated monopoly (eg England and Wales) 
– full privatisation of assets and responsibility
– legal monopoly (no competition)
– Full sale of water company property on the stock 
exchange market
– arms’ length regulation
• Delegation (eg France)
– public responsibility and property of assets
– (more or less competitive) delegation through lease 
contracts (“affermage”)
– vertical integration of the water industry along the 
value chain
Alternative management models
• Direct public management through own companies
– (eg Germany, Italy and most of EU; USA): 
– public responsibility
– public property of assets
– public management
– (eventual) partial privatisation of municipal enterprises maintaining 
entrepreneurial autonomy (D) or with limitations and unbundling (NL)
– Diffused involvement of private capital market on case-by-case (es. PPP or 
DBFO for single facilities)
– competition along the value chain is highest
• Emerging innovative solutions
– large consumers, groups of consumers or isolated communities eligible for
self-supply or autonomous provision
– private-public partnerships as alternative to delegation or regulated private 
monopoly
– corporate privatization of publicly-owned companies
Economic regulation
Unbundling/integration
Price regulation
Economic risk allocation
Regulation on SGI-PPP
Environmental regulation
Targets
Emission standards
Water quality standards
Incentives
Construction
Construction
Engineering services
Equipment
Support activities
Laboratories
External relations
Communication / education
RTD
Maintenance
Intermediation twds secondary markets
.....
Project / service design
Operational activities
Connections
Metering
Billing
Operational control
Network monitoring
Operation of facilities
.....
Regulatory sphere
Market sphere
Responsibility
Infrastructure
planning
Operation
Management core
Value chain of water services
OwnershipFinancing
Tendering
I market
II market
III market
Capital market
Economic regulation
Unbundling/integration
Price regulation
Economic risk allocation
Regulation on SGI-PPP
Environmental regulation
Targets
Emission standards
Water quality standards
Incentives
Construction
Construction
Engineering services
Equipment
Support activities
Laboratories
External relations
Communication / education
RTD
Maintenance
Intermediation twds secondary markets
.....
Project / service design
Operational activities
Connections
Metering
Billing
Operational control
Network monitoring
Operation of facilities
.....
Regulatory sphere
Market sphere
Responsibility
Infrastructure
planning
Operation
Management core
Value chain of water services - delegation
Ownership
Financing
Tendering
Contract
Construction
Construction
Engineering services
Equipment
Support activities
Laboratories
External relations
Communication / education
RTD
Maintenance
Intermediation twds secondary markets
.....
Project / service design
Operational activities
Connections
Metering
Billing
Operational control
Network monitoring
Operation of facilities
.....
Regulatory sphere
Market sphere
Responsibility
Infrastructure
planning
Operation
Management core
Value chain of water services – regulated monopoly
Ownership
Financing
Tendering
Economic regulation
Unbundling/integration
Price regulation
Economic risk allocation
Regulation on SGI-PPP
Environmental regulation
Targets
Emission standards
Water quality standards
Incentives
Regulation
Capital market
Market transactions
Economic regulation
Unbundling/integration
Price regulation
Economic risk allocation
Regulation on SGI-PPP
Environmental regulation
Targets
Emission standards
Water quality standards
Incentives
Construction
Construction
Engineering services
Equipment
Support activities
Laboratories
External relations
Communication / education
RTD
Maintenance
Intermediation twds secondary markets
.....
Operational activities
Connections
Metering
Billing
Operational control
Network monitoring
Operation of facilities
.....
Regulatory sphere
Market sphere
Responsibility
Operation
Management core
Value chain of water services – direct public management 
Ownership
Financing
Tendering
Infrastructure
planning
Project / service design
Capital market
Delegated Regulated monopoly Direct public management
Main example France England and Wales Germany
Responible entity
Municipality, ev. voluntarily or compulsorily 
associated
Water company Muncipality, ev. associated
Public (responsible entity)
Often multiutilities
Minority shares for private partners or other public bodies
Private company with concession contract Public law arrangements with different degrees of autonomy 
and governance structure
Variant: specific purpose company jointly owned by 
municipalities and private companies
Private law companies (with obligation for unbundling in case it 
is also active on other markets)
Responsible entity, either directly or through dedicated 
private law companies
Operator Responsible entity
(poss. mixed during the contract lifetime) Variant: assets owned by public entities and/or consumers’ 
associations (eg Wales)
Variant: users’ associations and individual consumers
Tender (based on a mixture of economic offer and 
“beauty contests”)
Direct (usually resulting from partial or total privatization of 
previously publicly-owned firms)
Variant (ITA):  tender for partner in mixed venture 
companies, with majority shares in public hands but 
operational decisions fully delegated to private partner
Variants: municipality may retain shares and even the 
majority of shares; governance rules protect the private
Vertical integration on make/buy considerations Vertical disintegration
Market for procurement
Joint ventures and PPP for specific initiatives (DBFO)
Variant/trend: 
·          increased outsourcing of service activities as well as 
procurement
·          Horizontal integration of distribution with gas/electricity; 
sewage treatment with waste management; dedicated 
companies for raw water production
No competition in the I market Competition in the II market
Inset appointments (possibility for new customers to choose 
their preferred operator with ev. bulk supply from the main 
one)
Procurement and outsourcing
Competition for company ownership in the stock exchange 
market
Yardstick competition (benchmarking)
Other examples 
(often involving 
variants)
ITA (few), ESP, East European countries NL, SWE, ITA AUT, GRE
Ownership of 
water resources
Public
Variant I (US): water rights can be privately appropriated and transferred
Variant II (some limited cases in Europe): licensed users can trade use rights under public supervision
Direct 
Structure of the 
industry along the 
value chain
Vertical integration aimed at maximising the value added 
produced in-house and minimize contract, operation and 
market risks
Ownership of 
water companies
Private Private
Legal form of 
operator
Private-law company is set up as a responsible entity; it is 
owned by a parent holding company whose assets are on the 
market
Patterns of 
competition
Competition for the I market
“Contract companies” usually produce only activities that 
require sunk costs that are specific for that contract; other 
activities are purchased from the parent company and/or from 
the market
Ownership of 
assets and 
infrastructure
Choice of operator
Private sector involvement in water services in Europe
Service Provision 
Responsibility 
Provision of the Operational Services Participation of Private Investors Outsourcing, delegating or assigning the Services 
A Municipalities Municipally owned Companies Capital investment projects Outsourcing for specific services
B
Regional Governments and 
Municipalities 
Municipally owned Companies Capital Investment projects such as BOT for Brussels 
WWT and minority equity partners in regional companies.
Outsourcing for specific activities done by responsible 
authority under contract 
DK
Municipalities Municipally owned Companies Usually for small rural service providers Responsibility of municipality to delegate or outsource 
functions. 
SF
Municipalities Municipally owned Companies No Outsourcing and contracting out of specific services 
takes place. 
F
Municipalities A mix of mainly private Operating Companies (2 
in particular) and municipalities 
Operations undertaken by private companies for about 
60% of municipalities – mainly AFFERMAGE contracts
Operational activities and risks can be delegated to third 
party entities. Outsourcing activities contracted by operating 
entities, either private or public
D
Municipalities Municipalities (85%, but 48% of population) or  
companies with majority municipality 
shareholding (15% but 52% of population) 
Possibilities for equity investment in municipality owned 
companies and in capital investment contracting schemes 
Outsourcing of specific services
GR
Municipalities Municipalities or Municipally owned companies Capital investment projects Specific services are outsourced and contracted to other 
parties. 
IRL
Municipalities City and county Councils Capital investment projects – DBOs for wastewater 
treatment in Cork, Dublin & Limerick.  Group Water 
Schemes – usually covering small rural areas 
Outsourcing of some specific functions to other operators 
like AWG 
ITA
Municipalities (associated 
in ATOs)
A mixture of Municipal/Mixed ltd. companies Investors in municipality companies and on a concession 
operation basis 
Outsourcing and contracting out of specific activities, 
particularly in capital investment projects 
L Municipalities Municipalities No No
NL
Municipalities Municipality (owned or majority publicly owned 
companies 
Investors in municipalities owned companies, but by law 
not able to take majority holdings. BOT/DBO contracts 
permitted, such as WWT for The Hague. 
Outsourcing of specific services or function permitted. 
P
Municipalities Municipality owned or majority owned 
Companies 
Investors in municipality companies operating concessions Outsourcing of specific services and delegation of services to 
concessionaire entities 
SPA
Municipalities Municipalities or municipality/private Companies Investors in municipality companies operating concessions Outsourcing the responsibility of municipalities 
SVE
Municipalities Municipally owned Companies No Responsibility of the municipality companies to decide. 
Specific functions are outsourced through Procurement Rules 
England-Wales: Private 
Companies under licence 
from Government
England-Wales: Private Companies England-Wales: Full privatisation with 100% private 
equity structures 
England-Wales: Outsourcing of some individual functions. 
Scotland-N.Ireland: 
Regional Assemblies and 
Executives 
Scotland-N.Ireland: Independent publicly owned 
Companies 
Scotland-N.Ireland: Capital investment projects – BOTs Scotland-N.Ireland: Some outsourcing of specific functions 
UK
Source: adapted from WRc-Ecologic, Study on the application of competition rules in the water sector in the European Community, Report to the European Commission – DgCompetition, 2003
Alternative models: capital cost
• Traditional model
– Public responsible for both OPEX and CAPEX
– Cost recovery for OPEX only; public finance for CAPEX
– Public finance or publicly-guaranteed financial institutions ó
interest rate corresponds to conventional inter-government 
lending rate
• British model: regulated monopoly
– Private responsible for both OPEX and CAPEX
– Market finance mechanism + FCR of new investment + existing 
assets evaluated at the privatization price (in E&W this 
corresponds only to 5% of reconstruction cost!)
• French model: delegation (lease contracts)
– Private responsible for OPEX, public for CAPEX
– FCR includes OPEX + lease charges (corresponding to loans)
Alternative models: capital cost
• German model: publicly-owned, partially privatized
companies
– Public enterprise responsible for both OPEX and CAPEX
– FCR for the full OPEX + CAPEX of all assets (including 
existing ones, valued at full reconstruction cost, depreciation
according to economic life)
• Italian model: delegation of operation and investment
– Private (or publicly-owned ltd) responsible for both OPEX and 
CAPEX
– Market finance mechanism + FCR for planned investment only
– Tariff regulation caps the cost of capital at max 7% (whatever
the managing model adopted)
Alternative models: economic risk (and r)
• UK model
– No market risk (except risk of takeover)
– Operational and capital risk is borne by water companies
– Performance risk also borne by water companies (quality 
regulation)
– Regulatory risk is reduced since Ofwat is committed to ensure 
industry viability
• French model
– Some market risk (although incumbents are normally favoured)
– Operational and performance risk on the private company
– Capital risk suffered by municipality (ev. shared)
– Regulatory risk is reduced via cooperative renegotiation of 
contracts; tradition of low conflictuality
Alternative models: economic risk (and r)
• German model
– No market risk (publicly-owned companies, even if partially
privatized)
– Performance risk on the company
– Operational and capital risk on the consumer via commitment to 
ensure ex-post full-cost recovery
• Italian model
– Market risk (tenders)
– Operational and performance risk on the company
– Capital risk shared and limited by the assumptions contained in 
the plan (problem: plans should be realistic)
– Regulatory risk difficult to predict since depends on future 
attitudes of local authorities; no formal commitment for
regulators to ensure viability of investment
Equalization mechanisms
• England and Wales (and to some extent Italy)
– Large management unitsó redistribution between high- and low-cost areas
– Water charges proportional to property size and not to consumption (E&W)
– “green dowry”: a significant part of the pre-existing debt has been re-
publicized (E&W)
– Continuing role of the public sector at least for “large” investment (eg 
interbasin transfers) (Ita)
• France
– Agences de l’Eau manage an ear-marked budget fuelled by a taxation 
mechanism ó around 15% of investment is financed at 0 interest
– Own capital is remunerated only if provided by the private company (what
occurs only in a few cases)
– Two-part tariffs with significant connection charge ó allows some 
redistribution in favour of large families / low property values
• Germany
– Cross-subsidiesó cash flows generated by all infrastructure fuel municipal 
CAPEX
– Very long depreciation schedules
– Two-part tariffs with high marginal rate per m3 (but low consumption !!)
WMS1 WMS2 WMSn
Public budget
…
Water users
WMS1 WMS2 WMSn
Public budget
…
Water users
Taxes
Subsidies
Water charges
WMS1 WMS2 WMSn
Regional water agencies
…
Water users
Water charges
WMS1 WMS2 WMSn
Bulk suppliers
…
Water users
Bulk prices (equal)
Water charges
Ear-marked taxes
Ear-marked subsidies (contribution to investment)
Summing up
Asset value Depreciation r Equalization
Traditional Not accounted Not depreciated based on conventional 
inter-governmental rate
Public budget
British
New investment + market
value of assets bought at
privatization
Private sector
accounting rules
Market rate based on 
investors' expectations
Territorial + no 
volumetric 
charge
French Historical cost Loan reimbursement
Based on public sector 
borrowing rates
Ear-marked 
basin systems
German Full reconstruction cost True economic life
Based on public sector 
borrowing rates
Cross-subsidy + 
public sector 
guarantees for 
loans
Italian New investment
Private sector
accounting rules
Market rate based on 
investors' expectations 
(capped at max 7%)
Territorial 
(some) + public 
budget for large 
projects
A simulation on an Italian case - I
ER L ER L ER L
Actual tariff 111 77 111 77 111 77
Actual operational cost 81 49 85 52 90 54
Actual margin for depreciation 30 28 26 26 21 23
Full cost existing 310 215 222 141 159 88
Full cost after WFD 11 45 9 31 6 22
Total (existing +WFD) 321 260 231 173 165 111
FCR - existing 36% 36% 50% 55% 70% 88%
FCR - existing + WFD 35% 30% 48% 45% 67% 70%
Price increase 190% 236% 109% 123% 49% 43%
Chicken Intermediate Public
– Chicken: depreciation max 30y; market-based r
– Intermediate: depreciation max 40y; public-sector borrowing r
– Public: depreciation = true economic life; r = pure cross-temporal rate
– All scenarios: asset value = reconstruction cost
A simulation on an Italian case - II
ER L ER L ER L
Incidence of water bill on average income
Mean 1,87% 1,41% 1,51% 1,09% 1,16% 0,77%
Min 1,34% 0,72% 1,07% 0,56% 0,81% 0,40%
Max 2,60% 2,35% 2,20% 2,01% 1,80% 1,68%
Incidence of water bill on low incomes
Mean 4,77% 5,86% 3,86% 4,54% 2,95% 3,21%
Min 3,45% 2,23% 2,77% 1,73% 2,09% 1,24%
Max 6,60% 6,22% 5,27% 4,67% 3,94% 3,74%
Chicken Intermediate Public
Advantages and shortcomings
• Traditional model
– Advantage: minimizes the cost of capital
– Shortcoming: need to rely directly or indirectly on public budget and public 
planning of investment; timing and size not necessarily coherent with needs
• British (and Italian) model
– Advantage: tariff provides only for new investment 
– Shortcoming: no guarantee that actual investment corresponds to true 
depreciation; risk that costs are shifted to future generations
• French (and Italian) model
– Advantage: reduces the cost of capital
– Shortcoming: risk of “dualism” if OPEX and CAPEX are separated; risk of 
“capture” is CAPEX is decided by operator but financed by the public
• German model
– Advantage: cost recovery is ensured in literal terms; infrastructure can be 
rebuilt at any time
– Shortcoming: need to monitor the use of cash flows that do not correspond 
to actual expenditure ó OK if public companies, but careful if private !!
– Other shortcoming: could lead to “gold plating” (unnecessary investment)
Delegated Regulated monopoly Direct public management
Market risk (tender) and recovery of sunk costs Regulatory risk
Operational risk (initial information missing or
wrong; emerging new issues during contract
lifetime)
Takeover
Commitment of public authority to ensure cost
recovery and viability
Unforeseen investment
Performance standard w/ fixed-price contracts Public reaction forces regulators to keep down
unpopular price increases
Information asymmetries Lower efficiency
Technological lock-in More vulnerable to pressures from workers and
consumers
Collusion leads to extraction of monopoly rent
shared by municipality and private company
Higher cost of capital
Quality reduction if contracts are not fully
specified and/or badly enforced
Cost pass-through
Cost pass-through Quality reduction corresponding to what quality
dimensions are actually specified by regulations and
service charter and enforced.
Tenders foresee insufficient investment Underinvestment
Technological lock-in Slowdown of environmental and quality expenditure due
to public budget pressures
Market power of operator face to suppliers
Vertical integration
Obligation for FCR In principle no subsidies and obligation for FCR; new
obligations only when tariff increase allow investment
to be viable
Water tariffs and charges intended as local taxes and
aimed at long-run FCR
Mutuality systems financed by ear-marked taxes Variant: public sector can assume part of the risk for
long-term infrastructure renewal in order to guarantee
against risk of bankruptcy 
Variants: public accounting does not consider
depreciation and capital costs; public budget finances
investment
Variant: public budget contributes to investment
with specific grants
All investment responsibilities on the water company
(variant: creation of specific purpose companies for the
ownership of assets, also responsible for fund raising
and owned by public or consumers)
Entirely on the public
Responsibility for regulators to ensure industry viability Cost-based tariffsó economic riskshifted to consumers
and/or taxpayers
Price caps and cost pass-through in order to share risk
of unexpected events with consumers
Some limited assumption of riskby private firms in DBFO
arrangements
Main risk 
dimensions for 
the private
Limited to DBFO and market for procurement
Main risk 
dimensions for 
the public
Regulatory capture
Main risk 
dimensions for 
consumers
Lower credibility of quality standard enforcement may
lead to deterioration of service quality
Main risk 
dimensions for 
future 
generations
Underinvestment induced by unwillingness to raise
tariffs in the short term
Main risk 
dimensions for 
suppliers / 
workers
Pressure for lower salaries – outsourcing and for
staffing reductions
Higher competition on procurement and reduced profit
margins for suppliers
Public subsidies 
and likelihood of 
self-sustaining 
WSS finance
Patterns of risk 
allocation
Investment risk separated from operational risk
Assessment methodology
• Assessment of scenarios based on a two-step methodology:
– Net social dividend: will scenarios imply overall efficiency improvement?
– Individual benefit: how is the net dividend shared among stakeholders ?
• “Net social dividend” could be positive or negative
– Efficiency improving factors: operational efficiency, more appropriate 
sizing decisions, higher propension
– Efficiency reducing factors: risk premium, higher cost of capital
– Incentives to over-invest or under-invest depend on rewarding structure
• Individual benefits could be positive or negative
– Even if overall costs are lower, some stakeholders could be worse off (eg 
higher prices; less employment)
– Distribution of costs and benefits depends on the regulatory structure
• Key issue is the allocation of economic and performance risk on 
different actors; this depends very much on the structure of the 
regulatory system (quality + pricing) than on the model itself
Stakeholders Main concerned outcomes Indicators
Profitability ROI / EVA
Corporate value Net asset value
Positive externalities (eg public health) Water-borne diseases
Synergies w/ public goods provision (eg
rainwater management)
Coherence with urban development patterns
Financial transfers (royalties, canons, revenues
from privatization etc)
Canons and royalties
Value for money Annual cost per hh
Affordability % of water bill on hh budget
Accessibility Service interruptions
Sizing / Capacity to meet peak demand
Achievement of water quality objectives Compliance w/ reg
Compliance with environmental and health
protection standards
Contribution of WSS to water environment
degradation
Volume of economic transactions with the
water sector
Value added and its composition
Levels and quality of employment Mean labour cost
Salaries
Technological development
Maintain the system financially viable in the
long term
Actual investment / real depreciation
Guarantee service functionality / resilience Degradation of water environment
Adopt state-of-the-art appropriate
technologies
Taxpayers Reduce impact of WSS on general budget Net contribution from/to the public budget
Companies and shareholders
Responsible entities
Customers
Environment / other water uses
Suppliers of inputs (eg workers)
Next generations
Stakeholders, concerned outcomes and indicators
Delegated Regulated monopoly Direct public management
Overall weak incentive to reduce costs in order to avoid
conflicts with trade unions
Quasi-market mechanisms (eg subsidy caps), price caps and
appropriate management rewarding schemes can provide
higher incentives, but lower than in the RM due to the
reduced risk of bankruptcy
Threaten to privatize can be effective if credible
Lowering factor: willingness to reduce conflicts
with local people and avoid unnecessary
investment; concessions provide permanent
disincentive to invest if not explicitly foreseen in
the contract
Lowering factor: price-caps provide permanent
incentive to minimize capital expenditure
Lowering factor : possibility to depreciate over longer time
schedules
Increasing factor: operator is vertically integrated
with construction industry, consultancies,
equipment manufacturing
Increasing factor: cost pass-through and cost-based
regulation provide permanent incentives to expand
investment; market often requires shorter repayment
schedules
Increasing factor : gold-plating, possibility to invest
(enhanced if the WSS system is more autonomous from local 
administration and tariffs are based on FCR); lower incentive
to make agreements with neighbouring services in order to
share infrastructure and sunk costs
Cost of capital High, proportional to risk effectively borne Medium-high; risk that regulator underestimates it for
keeping price low
Low, but constrained by public finance conditions, country
rating etc
Transactions 
costs
High (tender, contract, enforcement, monitoring,
conflict resolution)
Medium-high (regulatory agencies, reporting) Medium-low (higher if some of the above remedies are
adopted)
Soft regulation providing benchmarking and info Yardstick competition and econometric benchmarking Separate operation and management  from enforcement
Separate operation from AMDP Improve accountability through information,
benchmarking, reporting and public participation
Improve accountability through information, benchmarking,
reporting and public participation
Simplify awarding criteria, tender objects (eg single
activities vs. integrated service) and contract
duration; trade-off with level of PSI
Impose outsourcing through unbundling (trade-off with
coordination costs)
Private-law arrangements and contracts
Increase contractual power of local authorities
(associations etc)
Reduce risks by providing guarantees and/or by
keeping some part of the risk in public hands
Outsourcing and delegation of tasks
Reduce duration of contracts (requires solutions to
avoid sunk costs; 
Inset appointments Outsourcing
Reduce size of contracts (requires that public
authorities provide strategic planning of the WSS
system)
New customers DBFO
One-dimension bids based on economic
performance (requires very detailed contract
specification and separation btw operation and
asset management)
Allowing bigger consumers to bypass the utility
Compulsory outsourcing / unbundling btw I and II
market
Low due to permanent incentives to vertical
integration
More likely for labour-intensive activities and all
activities implying sunk costs and local presence
Potential for 
community 
management and 
individual 
solutions
Operational cost
Depends on awarding criteria: low incentive if
tenders are based on beauty contests and/or
protect incumbents; high incentive if based on
fixed price (trade off with risk)
Permament incentive to reduce costs particularly with
price-cap based regulation
Infrastructure 
cost
Main available 
strategies for 
improving 
performance
Potential for 
introducing more 
competition
Potential for 
outsourcing
High, but requires unbundling and transfer price
regulation
High; can be further expanded by legal provisions and/or
tight price regulation
Depends on the degree of development of the system, technical availability of low-cost solutions (eg self-treatment of effluents) and local circumstances (eg population
density). Suitable for less developed service areas (eg drinking water production wher
Non esistono solo le gare !!
• Market for corporate control ó garantire la contendibilità proprietaria delle
imprese monopoliste e degli asset
• Dall’ “intuitu personae” ai “beauty contests”ó meccanismi di aggiudicazione
discrezionali ma in un contesto di trasparenza e responsabilizzazione
• Yardstick competition + benchmarking ó confronti comparativi a distanza per 
valutare l’efficienza e le “best practices”
• Competition through “reputation and embarrassment”ó fare leva sull’interesse
delle imprese alla propria immagine
• Accountability and public participation ó limitare il rischio di “cattura del 
regolatore” attraverso il potenziamento della “voice”
• “Subsidy caps” and “quasi-markets” for public operators ó mettere in 
concorrenza i soggetti pubblici per l’accesso ai trasferimenti e fondi pubblici
• Community systems, eligible customers ó rendere possibile a determinati
segmenti di utenza di provvedere autonomamente
• “Concorrenza tra modelli”: la minaccia di privatizzazione è un ottimo strumento
per incentivare il pubblico, la minaccia di ri-pubblicizzazione è un ottimo
strumento per limitare il potere di mercato del gestore privato
Concorrenza vs. coordinamento verticale
• La concorrenza è possibile in alcune fasi, ma solo se il
coordinamento verticale della filiera è svolto dal soggetto pubblico; 
rischio di “dualismo” se la pianificazione degli investimenti è
separata dalla gestione
• Se il coordinamento verticale è affidato al gestore, la concorrenza
viene resa di fatto molto più difficile
– Necessità di contratti con lunghe durate (20-30 anni almeno)
– Difficile o impossibile scrivere contratti completi ex ante; necessità di 
rinegoziare continuamente
– Rischio di comportamento opportunistico sia da parte del gestore che del 
committenteó importanza delle aspettative sul comportamento futuro
dell’ente locale
– Vantaggi incolmabili per operatore incumbent
• La scelta del legislatore settoriale (l.36/94 e Dlgs 22/97) è stata
quella di affidare al gestore responsabilità integrate sulla filiera
Lezioni per il caso italiano - I
• Il problema del settore idrico non è liberalizzare per fare diminuire i prezzi (che
sono semmai troppo bassi), ma trovare sul mercato le risorse finanziarie per 
investimenti di manutenzione straordinaria, rimpiazzo ed estensione delle reti
ó il settore ha “bisogno di privato” e la concorrenza permette di governarlo
meglio
• La privatizzazione / liberalizzazione non sembra avere portato grandi benefici
in termini di riduzione dei costi, ma in compenso nemmeno grandi disastri in 
termini di riduzione della qualità; evidenza dell’importanza della regolazione
(quality + economic)
• Il settore continua ad essere caratterizzato da evidenti fallimenti del mercato; 
una partecipazione del settore privato può essere giudicata positiva, ma solo se 
si presta attenzione alle specificità della filiera
• La l.36/94 disegna un modello poco adatto al privato (per lo meno, poco adatto
all’affidamento con gara) poiché tende a massimizzare i rischi trasferiti sul
gestore (performance, operativo, capitale, regolatorio) aggiungendovi per di più
il rischio di mercato
Lezioni per il caso italiano - II
• Un settore che si presta poco alla gara, specie se questa viene 
intesa per il servizio integrato e mette insieme gestione operativa e 
investimenti
• “Gara o non gara” rischia di essere un falso problema se non si 
decide prioritariamente:
– Quale gara ?
– Cosa si mette in gara (es. gestione operativa o investimenti; singole attività o 
“gestione integrata”) ?
– Quali altri strumenti di regolazione (ex ante vs. ex post) ?
• Rischio che la necessità di specificare dettagliatamente il bando di 
gara faccia rientrare dalla finestra la pianificazione già in 
precedenza espulsa dalla porta
• Prioritario è garantire le condizioni affinché l’assetto regolatorio e 
le modalità di condivisione dei rischi incoraggiano l’investimento
Lezioni per il caso italiano - III
• Favorire modelli alternativi basati ad es.
– sull’outsourcing di funzioni operative nel quadro di una gestione organizzata 
dal pubblico, ev. attraverso forme di PPP
– Sulla separazione tra responsabilità operative e investimenti (ev. 
valorizzando istituto della SpA patrimoniale)
• Introdurre meccanismi di regolazione ex-post e in corso d’opera
– valorizzare la proposta progettuale del gestore (piano = obiettivi strategici e 
non “cose da fare”)
– Disciplinare le modalità di rinegoziazione
• Valorizzare il ruolo degli utenti anche attraverso meccanismi di
partecipazione alla governance societaria e/o alla valutazione 
partecipata dei risultati gestionali
• PPP: attenzione alla specificità italiana
– Secondo approccio EU, PPP sono strumenti per condividere il rischio con un 
partner (industriale) privato e NON uno strumento per creare imprese
– Ma allora come la mettiamo con le ex-municipalizzate che sono PPP, ma con 
un rapporto ribaltato in cui la competenza industriale appartiene al pubblico?
